Protective Wrapping of Off-the-Shelf Components by van der Meulen M et al.
School of Computing Science,
University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Protective Wrapping of Off-the-Shelf
Components
Meine van der Meulen, Steve Riddle, Lorenzo Strigini, and
Nigel Jefferson
Technical Report Series
CS-TR-857
August 2004
Copyright c©2004 University of Newcastle upon Tyne
Published by the University of Newcastle upon Tyne,
School of Computing Science, Claremont Tower, Claremont Road,
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, UK.
Protective Wrapping of Off-the-Shelf Components
Meine van der Meulen1, Steve Riddle2, Lorenzo Strigini1, and Nigel Jefferson2
1 Centre for Software Reliability, City University, London, U.K.
WWW home page: http://www.csr.city.ac.uk
2 School of Computing Science, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, U.K.
WWW home page: http://www.csr.ncl.ac.uk
Abstract. System designers using off-the-shelf components (OTSCs),
whose internals they cannot change, often use add-on wrappers to
adapt the OTSCs' behaviour as required. In most cases, wrappers are
used to change functional properties of the components they wrap. In
this paper we discuss instead protective wrapping, the use of wrap-
pers to improve the dependability  i.e., non-functional properties like
availability, reliability, security, and/or safety  of a component and thus
of a system. Wrappers can improve dependability by adding fault toler-
ance, e.g. graceful degradation, or error recovery mechanisms. We discuss
the rational specification of such protective wrappers in view of system
dependability requirements, and highlight some of the design trade-offs
and uncertainties affecting system design with OTSCs and wrappers, and
differentiating it from other forms of fault-tolerant design.
1 Introduction
As building component-based software systems becomes more common, it be-
comes more often necessary to combine existing components  hardware as well
as software  that were not necessarily designed to work together. Wrapping is
a popular, often cost-effective technique for integrating pre-existing components
into a system. When designing a new system, ad hoc wrappers are developed,
i.e. new, small components that will be interposed between the others, reading
and altering the contents of the communications they exchange. Wrapping has
the advantage of not requiring detailed knowledge of the internal structure of
the components being wrapped.
In most cases, wrappers are used to adapt the functionality of a component
to the requirements set for it by the system's design: they often perform simple
functions like translation between the argument formats used by two commu-
nicating components. In this paper we look instead at the use of wrappers for
improving dependability. We call such wrappers protective wrappers. Protec-
tive wrapping is a way of structuring the provision of standard fault tolerance
functions, like error detection, confinement and recovery, plus the less common
function of preventing component failures, in a component-based design where
dependability is a concern. We wish to clarify how these wrappers can be ra-
tionally specified, the trade-offs facing system designers (simply designers for
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the rest of the paper), and the peculiarities of this form of fault-tolerant design,
compared to the general case.
When designing a system with off-the-shelf components (OTSCs), it is often
the case that an OTSC's functionality, and even more often its dependability, is
insufficiently documented. Both these deficiencies are threats to system depend-
ability: wrong assumptions about how an OTSC is intended to behave lead to
system design faults; optimistic assumptions about an OTSC's probability of be-
having as intended may lead to overestimating the dependability levels achieved
by the chosen system design. Wrapping can help a designer to compensate for
this lack of information.
Wrapping for dependability has been addressed by other authors. Wrappers
are used to transform or filter unwanted communications that may cause fail-
ures. Fault injection may be used to identify such failure-causing values [7,3,5].
Wrappers are proposed to protect OTS applications that do not deal properly
with kernel-raised exceptions, by transforming these into other exceptions or er-
ror return codes [7]; or to protect OTS kernels against inappropriate requests
([3]; here, an extended notion of wrappers is proposed that can access the ker-
nel's internal data). In [5], the goal is automatic protection of library components
against failure-causing parameter values, submitted by accident or malice. In [4],
wrappers protect name servers from receiving unverifiable requests. A somewhat
general approach to wrappers for common security concerns is described in [6].
Most of this previous work assumes that a good knowledge can be gained
about which communications will cause OTSC failure. We have argued for a more
general view of protective wrapping [9], to take into account the fact that this
knowledge is usually deficient, the specification of the OTSC may be incomplete,
and designers need to be concerned with failures of both the OTSC and the ROS.
Here, we discuss issues of design, verification and quantitative dependability
trade-offs that arise in protective wrapping.
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 introduces terminology and an illustrative
example. Section 3 introduces the specifications of components in relation to
system-level requirements, including those concerning fault tolerance. Sections 4
and 5 discuss the options for the actual semantics of wrappers, i.e. the cues that
can trigger their intervention and the forms of these interventions. Section 6 sets
the previous discussion of wrapper specifications in the context of probabilistic
system dependability requirements and discusses the important design trade-offs
that arise. Our conclusions follow.
2 System Model and Example
Throughout this paper, we will use a simple example to clarify the concepts in-
troduced. The example system (Figure 1) is a water boiler. We focus on a single
OTSC, in this case a PID (Proportional-Integral-Derivative) controller which
provides feed-back control for the burner of the boiler, and on its communica-
tions with the rest of the system, seen as a single black box (ROS); the ROS
may contain other OTSCs. This example omits some of the possible complica-
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Fig. 1. The boiler control system used as an example.
tions of a real system (an OTSC may have direct communication links with the
environment around the system, or communications with the ROS that cannot
be intercepted by a wrapper) but will suffice for this brief discussion. We do not
make any assumptions about whether the OTSC, ROS and wrapper are realised
in hardware or software (or both).
The ROS outputs readings (p; T ) of pressure and temperature in the boiler,
and accepts a burner control input, BC, and an exception signal, ETTH , which
causes an alarm to a human operator. The OTSC accepts as inputs two real
numbers (p0; T 0) and a reset signal, and outputs a (real-valued) control signal
for the burner, BC 0.
The designer is concerned with the dependability of this system: how fre-
quently the components will behave abnormally (will fail), whether these com-
ponent failures will cause system failure, and whether the frequency and severity
of these failures will be acceptably low. Because of this concern, instead of con-
necting the ROS outputs directly to the OTSC's inputs and vice versa, the
designer introduces a protective wrapper between the ROS and the OTSC, as
depicted, which transforms p into p0, etc.
The wrapper monitors communications between the ROS and OTSC, and
possibly changes the values transmitted to the ROS or the OTSC. The ROS sees
the combination of the OTSC and wrapper as one component, which we call the
wrapped OTSC (WOTSC); likewise, the OTSC sees a wrapped ROS.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume here that the OTS and ROS, if con-
nected without the protective wrapper, would, in the absence of failures, produce
the combined behaviour required from the system. So, the OTSC in Figure 1 does
not need functional wrapping, limiting our discussion to protective wrapping.
3 Roles of Components and Protective Wrappers
3.1 System requirements, components and interfaces
The designer's problem is how to ensure the required behaviour of the whole
system, using a given OTSC. When considering dependability, a designer usu-
ally deals with multiple sets of requirements on system behaviour. First, there is
a specified nominal behaviour: what the system ought to do, at least if none of
4 van der Meulen et al
its components fail. The designer usually has an understanding of a nominal be-
haviour for each component, and makes sure that if all components exhibit their
nominal behaviours, then so will the system. Making the system fault-tolerant
means ensuring that even if components violate their nominal behaviours (they
fail), the system will still exhibit nominal behaviour (failure masking) or some
degraded but acceptable behaviour (graceful degradation) or at least will re-
main within an envelope of safe behaviours; the choice being determined by
the system dependability requirements and by the costs of these various options.
The complete dependability requirements will inevitably be probabilistic: in
addition to defining a nominal behaviour and zero or more degraded behaviours
or modes of operation, it will include required probabilities of these assertions
holding during operation of the system1. A similar hierarchy of a nominal be-
haviour and more or less acceptable failure behaviours applies to dependability
requirements for any component or subsystem.
In this and the next two sections, we will discuss the deterministic part of
these dependability properties. In a proper design, the specified system-level
properties need to be verifiable, in the sense that, given clear descriptions of how
the various components will behave (in their nominal and degraded modes) and
of their connections, one can deduce that the requirements for the whole system
(for a nominal or degraded mode, as specified) are satisfied. The expected or re-
quired behaviours (models and specifications in what follows) of the components
and of the system need to be described in some unambiguous language, e.g.,
preconditions and postconditions characterising the relation between sequences
of their inputs and outputs [8].
These descriptions need not specify all details of behaviour of a component,
i.e. they may be partial specifications. We might for instance describe a compo-
nent in a numerical library as computing a certain floating-point result with a
relative error of less than 1%, although in reality the relative error is smaller, and
variable; or, rather than trying to describe in detail what a component would do
if it failed, we would rather describe an envelope of plausible behaviours it may
exhibit, and prove that some system-level requirement will be satisfied provided
the component remains within that envelope.
The behaviour that the designer expects the OTSC, as procured, to exhibit
can be described abstractly as pairs of pre and post-conditions [8]. The looser
the postconditions (the fewer the restrictions assumed on the behaviour of the
OTSC), the more arbitrary behaviours of the OTSC one will need to require
the wrapper and ROS to cope with in order to guarantee any given system-level
requirement. This may make the system more robust, but at a cost, which will be
the more acceptable, the more likely the extra erroneous behaviours allowed by
1 It is true that such a formal way of specifying dependability requirements is only in
common use for few categories of systems. For many everyday systems, probabilities
may not be mentioned at all, for instance. Yet, we think that any rational definition
of requirements will include some idea of what probabilities would be unacceptably
high for each given failure (i.e., degraded behaviour) mode, and a partial ordering
between more and less acceptable modes.
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the less restrictive model of the OTSC are in reality. Symmetrical considerations
apply to the designer's expectations about the ROS's behaviour.
3.2 The Models of the OTSC and ROS
We assume that the designer has chosen a particular OTSC, either procured on
the market or already available within the same company. For an OTSC from
the commercial market, the documentation will often be of lower quality and
procuring extra information is often cumbersome and expensive; on the other
hand, if the component is in frequent use, the supplier may have reliable data on
its dependability. Publicly available dependability data  e.g., collections of bug
reports for software packages  may also be valuable, if they exist. Relevant other
information about the OTSC may concern maintenance requirements, failure
modes and their failure rates.
The documentation of the OTSC may not specify its behaviour in certain
circumstances, and the designer's most prudent approach would then be to as-
sume that it is completely undetermined. At the opposite extreme, designers
may choose to guess the OTSC's behaviour, based on previous experience, ex-
pert knowledge or other information.
By contrast, the designer may have a more precise model of the ROS, if
designed ad hoc or if it also uses wrapping to ensure predictable behaviour.
Boiler example A specific PID controller has been chosen as the OTSC.
Suppose that its documentation is unclear about what happens when either p
or T is negative. The designer's model of the OTSC may then prudently assume
its behaviour as undefined when these preconditions are violated. There may be
other preconditions, documented or suspected, for the PID controller to behave
properly, e.g., upper bounds on the values and rates of change of p0 and T 0.
As for the model of the ROS, to prove that the system has correct (nominal)
behaviour if no component fails, the designer will use a model that includes the
sensors and actuators, the physical properties of the burner, the fluid in the
boiler, etc. This alone may not guarantee the above preconditions for nominal
behaviour of the OTSC. It will then be the wrapper's task to guarantee them.
3.3 Requirements on the Wrapped OTSC and ROS
The designer's specification for the WOTSC may differ from the model of the
OTSC even in its nominal behaviour, e.g. by hiding from the ROS some of the
functions offered by the OTSC. In addition, the WOTSC specification has to de-
scribe dependability requirements, which determine the need for fault tolerance
provisions in the wrapper.
Boiler example The boiler needs from the PID controller a control signal,
BC, derived from the pressure and the temperature of the boiler according
to a PID control law. A degraded, safe behaviour from the system viewpoint
is to switch off the boiler (BC = 0). Knowing that the OTSC's behaviour is
undefined for negative p0 or T 0, the designer may then specify that the WOTSC
must behave like the OTSC, if p  0 and T  0, but if not, it must set BC to 0.
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In addition, since the precondition for nominal behaviour of the OTSC re-
quires p0  0 and T 0  0, the designer may specify that the WROS must
guarantee these properties (e.g. if p < 0, p0 will be 0), All these specifications
together define the specifications of the wrapper. Since the wrapper alters the
interface behaviour of the ROS and OTSC, the designer needs to verify that
these modified behaviours imply the required system behaviour. For instance,
at the interface of the ROS with the wrapper, the ROS sees a component that
behaves (nominally) as a PID controller except that, if p or T is negative, its
inputs and output are clamped to zero.
4 Specifying the Protective Wrapper: Cues for
Intervention
Usually, designers of fault-tolerant systems use the detection of errors to trig-
ger defensive actions. This depends on a fairly accurate knowledge of the be-
haviour of all components when failure-free. In designing with OTSCs, though,
this knowledge cannot be assumed. Furthermore, the design of OTSCs often pre-
cludes close monitoring for early error detection. So, designers may want their
wrappers to react to a pattern of component behaviour that merely suggests a
failure, although it may be correct, especially if the type and circumstances of
the suspected failure would cause severe consequences to the system.
So, designers may take an attitude similar to that frequently taken in de-
signing for safety: aiming more at keeping the behaviour of components within
an envelope of behaviours that prevent unacceptable damage at system level,
than at guaranteeing their correct (nominal) behaviour. They also face the same
kind of trade-offs: the interventions of the wrapper will usually prevent some
requested operation of the OTSC, possibly providing in its place a safe failure,
or an alternative, degraded or less efficient service. Designers thus know that the
more cues they decide to react to, the less likely the system will be to fail in
unpredictable ways, but also the more likely for wrapper interventions to be the
result of false alarms, and the more degradation in performance or availability.
The wrapper, as depicted in Figure 1, monitors the outputs of the ROS and
of the OTSC for cues, and can manipulate their values before forwarding them to
the corresponding inputs of the OTSC and of the ROS, respectively. It can also
insert communications not initiated by the ROS or OTS, for instance exception
signals in response to cues it has detected.
In the wrapper's specifications, pre-conditions about the possible cues will be
matched with postconditions about actions for the wrapper to take in response.
5 Examples of Specifications for Wrapper Actions
For any given cue, the designer may choose among various possible reactions by
the wrapper, depending on the system's architecture and dependability require-
ments. A few possible reactions were described in Sect. 3. We now discuss other
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possibilities for providing fault tolerance via the wrapper. Some of these have
been applied in our project in a case study in a simulated environment [1].
For instance, let us consider the case in which the ROS fails and issues a
suspicious p value, e.g. a negative value, violating a precondition for the PID
controller, whose behaviour is then unspecified. As in Sect. 3, the wrapper could
mitigate the consequences of such a failure by substituting this erroneous, danger-
ous or suspicious signal value with other values. This keeps the PID controller in
a region of operation for which its behaviour is predictable. This may not ensure
correct system behaviour, but it may be sufficient protection e.g. against noise
spikes on sensor readings, given the robustness of the PID control law. With a
slight complication, the wrapper could be specified to set p to its last previous
value, rather than 0, to reduce the step change in the input to the OTSC.
In many cases, though, it is not judged useful to correct a suspicious input
value to the ROS or the OTSC. It may still be possible to prevent harm by
checking and if necessary correcting their subsequent outputs. Suppose that a
failure causes suspicious values of p. The designer may decide that the wrap-
per will then perform additional plausibility checks on the output of the PID
controller. If the checks fail, the wrapper could ensure graceful degradation by
providing a simpler version of the OTSC's (or ROS's) function. The designer
might specify this kind of switch if the degraded control were proven to keep
the boiler in an acceptable degraded mode of operation for as long as the OTSC
cannot be trusted to perform correctly.
All these palliative measures may only be acceptable for a short time. If they
persist, a reaction can be for the wrapper to enforce at least safe system-level
behaviour, by switching the burner off (BC 0 = 0): an extreme form of graceful
degradation suitable for all undesired situations.
Another possibility is error recovery. In many OTSCs, after most failures a
reset is sufficient to restore an internal state such that the OTSC will subse-
quently exhibit correct (nominal) behaviour. In our example, the wrapper could
reset the PID controller (OTSCS) if its output is clearly out of bounds. Reset
erases the OTSC's memory of previous history: it does not generally guarantee
that its future behaviour will be appropriate from a system viewpoint, but it
may in a control system like our example, if the designer can demonstrate that
the internal state of the OTSC will then return to a correct state (through the
OTSC reading and processing its inputs) quickly enough.
More complex recovery actions can be specified. If, for instance, an OTSC has
an undo operation, the wrapper could use it for backward recovery and retry ; a
wrapper could store sequences of input messages to an OTSC and replay them
after recovery, possibly even with slight variations to reduce the risk of repeated
failure (retry blocks" architecture [2]). The possibilities here are bounded by
the risk implicit in increasing the complexity of the wrapper, and thus the risk
of specification or implementation errors. For instance, designers may often limit
themselves to stateless wrappers.
The case of reset is an example of a wrapper generating exception signals
rather than just manipulating the normal ROS-OTSC communications. As an-
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other example, the wrapper can generate an exception signal to the ROS, ETTH ,
when e.g. the OTSC's BC 0 output, or the T reading, exceeds specified bounds.
Last, many of the actions described so far may not be effective, e.g. if the
cue to which they react is caused by a permanent or recurrent fault. If this is
considered too likely, wrappers may be designed to escalate to more drastic and
safer actions (multi-level recovery). E.g., once it has entered a graceful degra-
dation state, a wrapper could become sensitive to cues that it would otherwise
ignore, and trigger a more drastic action if any of these cues occurs. After the
wrapper has reset the PID controller, it may set a time-out after which it will
shut down the boiler if normal control has not resumed. Again, designers need
to judge at which point the added complexity becomes counterproductive.
6 Probabilistic Dependability Properties
Up to this point, we have approached wrapper design mostly from a determin-
istic viewpoint: the designer considers the possibility of certain unplanned-for
sequences of actions of the OTSC or ROS, and specifies the wrapper so that it
will mask or alter those behaviours in ways that appear desirable, to achieve one
of the specified nominal or degraded modes of operation.
This desirability must be determined in view of the system-level dependabil-
ity requirements, which are inevitably, in their general form, probabilistic, as
outlined in Section 3.
A wrapper may be meant to avoid or mask certain component failures, or to
mitigate them; it may improve system dependability by avoiding certain system
failures, i.e. increasing the probability of nominal behaviour, or by mitigating
them, i.e. shifting some probability from more severely to less severely degraded
behaviours.
As always with fault tolerance, wrapping faces two kinds of trade-offs, i.e.
between the improvement in dependability that it produces by avoiding or mit-
igating some failures, and (i) its direct costs, in development effort and in terms
of run-time resources; and (ii) the dependability loss that wrappers cause by
causing failures or making them more severe.
Costs are generally the easiest factor to estimate. Estimating dependability
improvements may be difficult. In some cases, system failures due to specific
failure modes of OTSCs are observed often enough that it is easy to assess the
expected effect of avoiding them (and to determine how to). But if a system
is already reasonably dependable without wrapping, the dependability gain will
be uncertain. Even so, designers will think it reasonable to provide abilities at
least to deal with predictable component failures that have a clear potential for
severe effects and can be avoided or tolerated at low cost. This appears to be
the approach, for instance, of the HEALERS project [5]. However, this common
sense approach, when extended to less obvious failures, is not guaranteed to
improve dependability, due to difficulties with the second trade-off.
As said in Sec. 4, interventions by wrappers generally substitute a controlled
degraded system behaviour (a more acceptable failure) for a potentially uncon-
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trolled failure. The designers decide to which cues the wrapper reacts. Including
more cues avoids more uncontrolled failures, but also causes more wrapper inter-
ventions on false alarms, causing degraded behaviour when nominal behaviour
would otherwise occur. Designers cannot a priori judge which occurrences of a
given cue are false alarms, and thus whether, statistically, wrapper intervention
on that cue improves dependability. Besides, in many systems the effects of wrap-
per interventions on the behaviour of the whole system will be more complex to
trace than in our boiler example.
A wrapper may also cause system failures in the the obvious way, because
of bugs or physical faults, and deliver, for instance, a wrong input for the ROS
despite having received a correct OTSC output; or, for the same reason, not
react to a cue as specified. For many systems this risk will be negligible, however,
because the wrappers will be simple and easy to verify, compared to the risk of
either false alarms or failures to intervene that are directly due to the designers'
choices. That is, most wrapper failures will be due to the inherent limits of the
algorithms that a designer can feasibly apply. Error detection, for example, often
depends on reasonableness checks, which cannot flag values that are erroneous
but reasonable. They can be made more stringent at the cost of using cues
that are not sure indications of errors. Designers thus know how to shift the
balance between false alarms and uncontrolled failures, and can even choose
which component failure modes the wrappers will not detect or tolerate, and in
which circumstances they may produce false alarms. Unfortunately, they still do
not usually know the frequency of these events, so that the uncertainty on the
actual dependability improvement achieved by wrapping is not resolved.
Design faults in wrappers remain a potential problem in the case of more
complex wrappers. Designers must decide how sophisticated a wrapper they
can specify to be before this very sophistication becomes counterproductive. To
make the transition less sharp, it may be worthwhile to seek wrapper design
techniques that bias wrappers towards benign failures, whose consequences
can be assessed, rather than uncontrolled ones, like injecting arbitrary values in
a communication stream.
7 Conclusion
We have tried to clarify some issues concerning protective wrapping. Protective
wrappers are components that monitor and ensure the non-functional properties
at interfaces between components. We have described the role that protective
wrapping may play as a special case of fault-tolerant design, from both the
viewpoints of deterministic and of probabilistic dependability properties.
These considerations should help designers in specifying wrappers, using the
spectrum of fault-tolerance techniques within the special constraints of wrapping
as a design structuring scheme. These peculiarities are not always acknowledged
in previous literature. The main considerations we have made are: wrappers
can be rigorously specified on the basis of the designers' specification of the
OTSC's behaviours in its possibly multiple modes of operation: from nominal,
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correct behaviour to manageable, non catastrophic failure modes. Also, due to
poor documentation and poor ability to detect run-time errors inside off-the-
shelf components, protective wrappers may have to act on cues of potentially
erroneous and/or error-causing communications between components. All of this
increases the importance of design trade-offs between reducing the probabilities
of the more dangerous system failure modes and avoiding too frequent false
alarms leading to degraded service or safe system failures.
Research developments that appear desirable concern formal proof, proba-
bilistic modelling and experimental evaluation. Formal proof methods, tailored
to the restricted sets of structures defined by wrapping and the kinds of prop-
erties it involves, are desirable to support the verification steps described in
Sec. 3. Probabilistic modelling should support designers in choosing trade-offs
as discussed here; it must cover both the structural aspects of how component
failures cause system failure, aspects that are well developed in modelling of
fault tolerance, and the uncertainty on the reliability of the individual compo-
nents and their probabilities of failing together, as studied in software reliability
research and the assessment of software diversity. Last, experimental evaluation
of systems using protective wrapping is required, to document the ranges of er-
ror coverage levels, false alarm rates and system dependability achieved with
various classes of wrapper designs and of OTSC components and thus give some
basis for informing probabilistically based decisions.
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